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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH : 
Plaintiff/Appellee : 
vs. : 
: Case No. 20030902-CA 
ROBERT HAL OLSEN, JR. 
Defendant/Appellant : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a plea and subsequent sentencing to Possession of a 
Controlled Substance, a third degree felony in violation of U.C.A. § 58-37-8. 
On October 27, 2003, the Honorable Roger S. Dutson signed an entry of 
judgment, sentence and commitment sentencing the Defendant to serve a term 
of zero to five years at the Utah State Prison. On November 7, 2003, the 
Defendant filed a notice of appeal. This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(e)(2003). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT 
SENTENCED THE DEFENDANT TO PRISON? 
Standard of Review: The Court must determine whether the trial court abused 
its discretion when it sentenced the Defendant to prison even though the 
offense was Defendant's first felony and first drug related offense. "A 
sentence will not be overturned on appeal unless the trial court has abused its 
discretion, failed to consider all legally relevant factors, or imposed a sentence 
that exceeds legally prescribed limits." State v. Nuttall, 861 P.2d 454, 456 
(Utah Ct.App. 1993). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
U.C.A. § 58-37-8. Prohibited acts -- Penalties. 
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to 
knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to produce, 
manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, consent, 
offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to distribute; or 
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where: 
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct which results in 
any violation of any provision of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d 
that is a felony; and 
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more violations of 
Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on separate occasions that are 
undertaken in concert with five or more persons with respect to whom the 
person occupies a position of organizer, supervisor, or any other position of 
management. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect to: 
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(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, a controlled substance analog, 
or gammahydroxybutyric acid as listed in Schedule III is guilty of a second 
degree Mony and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a first 
degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is guilty of a 
third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a 
second degree felony; or 
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A misdemeanor 
and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(c) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of Subsection 
(l)(a)(ii) or (iii) may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term 
as provided by law, but if the trier of fact finds a firearm as defined in Section 
76-10-501 was used, carried, or possessed on his person or in his immediate 
possession during the commission or in furtherance of the offense, the court 
shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a term of one year to run 
consecutively and not concurrently; and the court may additionally sentence 
the person convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run 
consecutively and not concurrently. 
(d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a)(iv) is guilty of a 
first degree felony punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term of 
not less than seven years and which may be for life. Imposition or execution of 
the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for probation. 
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a controlled 
substance analog or a controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid 
prescription or order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of 
his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this chapter; 
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any building, 
room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place knowingly and 
intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons unlawfully possessing, 
using, or distributing controlled substances in any of those locations; or 
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an altered or 
forged prescription or written order for a controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to: 
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a second 
degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana, if the amount is 
more than 16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, or a controlled substance 
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analog, is guilty of a third degree felony; or 
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted resin from 
any part of the plant, and the amount is more than one ounce but less than 16 
ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possession of any controlled 
substance by a person, that person shall be sentenced to a one degree greater 
penalty than provided in this Subsection (2). 
(d) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to all other 
controlled substances not included in Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or (iii), 
including less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
Upon a second conviction the person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor, and 
upon a third or subsequent conviction the person is guilty of a third degree 
felony. 
(e) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside the 
exterior boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as defined 
in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement shall be 
sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in Subsection (2)(b), 
and if the conviction is with respect to controlled substances as listed in: 
(i) Subsection (2)(b), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an 
indeterminate term as provided by law, and: 
(A) the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted to a term of 
one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and 
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an 
indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not 
concurrently; and 
(ii) Subsection (2)(d), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an 
indeterminate term as provided by law, and the court shall additionally 
sentence the person convicted to a term of six months to run consecutively and 
not concurrently. 
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(ii) or (2)(a)(iii) is: 
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor; 
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and 
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree felony. 
(g) A person is subject to the penalties under Subsection (4)(c) who, in an 
offense not amounting to a violation of Section 76-5-207: 
(i) violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) by knowingly and intentionally having in his 
body any measurable amount of a controlled substance; and 
(ii) operates a motor vehicle as defined in Section 76-5-207 in a negligent 
manner, causing serious bodily injury as defined in Section 76-1-601 or the 
death of another. 
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(3) Prohibited acts C — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a controlled 
substance a 
license number which is fictitious, revoked, suspended, or issued to another 
person or, for the purpose of obtaining a controlled substance, to assume the 
title of, or represent himself to be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, 
physician, dentist, veterinarian, or other authorized person; 
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to procure the 
administration of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe or dispense to any 
person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain possession of, or to procure 
the administration of any controlled substance by misrepresentation or failure 
by the person to disclose his receiving any controlled substance from another 
source, fraud, forgery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or 
written order for a controlled substance, or the use of a false name or address; 
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a 
controlled substance, or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription or written 
order issued or written under the terms of this chapter; or 
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or other 
thing designed to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark, trade name, or 
other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or any likeness of any of 
the foregoing upon any drug or container or labeling so as to render any drug a 
counterfeit controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) is guilty of a third 
degree felony. 
(4) Prohibited acts D — Penalties: 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not authorized 
under this chapter who commits any act declared to be unlawful under this 
section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under Title 58, 
Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances Act, is upon conviction subject 
to the penalties and classifications under this Subsection (4) if the trier of fact 
finds the act is committed: 
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the grounds 
of any of those schools; 
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary institution or 
on the grounds of any of those schools or institutions; 
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other structure or 
grounds which are, at the time of the act, being used for an activity sponsored 
by or through a school or institution under Subsections (4)(a)(i) and (ii); 
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(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility; 
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center; 
(vi) in or on the grounds of a house of worship as defined in Section 76-10-
501; 
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, movie 
house, playhouse, or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto; 
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure; 
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included in 
Subsections (4)(a)(i) through (viii); 
(x) in the immediate presence of a person younger than 18 years of age, 
regardless of where the act occurs; or 
(xi) for the purpose of facilitating, arranging, or causing the transport, 
delivery, or distribution of a substance in violation of this section to an inmate 
or on the grounds of any correctional facility as defined in Section 76-8-311.3. 
(b) A person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of a first degree 
felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than five years if the 
penalty that would otherwise have 
been established but for this subsection would have been a first degree felony. 
Imposition or execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person 
is not eligible for probation. 
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established would 
have been less than a first degree felony but for this Subsection (4), a person 
convicted under Subsection (2)(g) or this Subsection (4) is guilty of one degree 
more than the maximum penalty prescribed for that offense. 
(d) (i) If the violation is of Subsection (4)(a)(xi): 
(A) the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term 
as provided by law, and the court shall additionally sentence the person 
convicted for a term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and 
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an 
indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not 
concurrently; and 
(ii) the penalties under this Subsection (4)(d) apply also to any person who, 
acting with the mental state required for the commission of an offense, directly 
or indirectly solicits, requests, commands, coerces, encourages, or intentionally 
aids another person to commit a violation of Subsection (4)(a)(xi). 
(e) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this Subsection (4) that the 
actor mistakenly believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at the 
time of the offense or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor that the 
actor mistakenly believed that the location where the act occurred was not as 
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described in Subsection (4)(a) or was unaware that the location where the act 
occurred was as described in Subsection (4)(a). 
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class 
B misdemeanor. 
(6) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, 
and not in lieu of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by 
law. 
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of 
another state, conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of another 
state for the same act is a bar to prosecution in this state. 
(7) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof 
which shows a person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, 
distributed, or dispensed a controlled substance or substances, is prima facie 
evidence that the person or persons did so with knowledge of the character of 
the substance or substances. 
(8) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the 
course of his professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing, 
dispensing, or administering controlled substances or from causing the 
substances to be administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction and 
supervision. 
(9) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on: 
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Substances Act who 
manufactures, distributes, or possesses an imitation controlled substance for 
use as a placebo or investigational new drug by a registered practitioner in the 
ordinary course of professional practice or research; or 
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate scope of 
his employment. 
(10) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to 
any person or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter shall 
be given effect without the invalid provision or application. 
U.C.A. §78-2a-3(2)(e)(2003)- Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those 
involving a conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony; 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant was charged by information with Possession of a 
Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, a second degree felony. (R. 
001). On August 25, 2003, the Defendant appeared in court and waived his 
preliminary hearing. (R. 013). On September 8, 2003, the Defendant pled no 
contest to an amended charge of Possession of a Controlled Substance, a third 
degree felony. Sentencing was scheduled for October 10, 2003. The 
Defendant failed to appear and a bench warrant was issued. (R. 026). The 
Defendant was sentenced on October 20, 2003, to a term of zero to five years 
at the Utah State Prison. (R. 031-32). The sentence, judgment and 
commitment was signed on October 27, 2003. (R. 031-32). A notice of appeal 
was filed on October 7, 2003. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The Defendant was charged by information with Possession of a 
Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, a second degree felony. On 
September 8, 2003 the Defendant pled no contest to an amended charge of 
Possession of a Controlled Substance, a third degree felony. At the time of the 
plea, the trial judge asked the State what was alleged to have happened. (R. 
43/4). The prosecutor answered, "The police were called to a domestic 
disturbance. When they tried to stop him to talk to him about what happened, 
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and he ran and threw something that they retrieved and discovered was a 
quarter ounce of methamphetamine.'' (R. 43/5). 
The Defendant was sentenced on October 20, 2003. During the 
sentencing hearing, Defendant's attorney informed the court Defendant had 
already spent forty-eight days in jail. He asked the court to not impose any 
further jail time, and other than that request, he asked the Court to follow 
AP&P's recommendation. (R. 43/6). 
The trial judge responded, "[m]y inclination is to send him to prison, so 
if you wish to speak to that. He's clearly involved in dealing meth, although 
he's not charged with it. Meth is a bane on our society, and anybody that's 
running around with lots of baggies to sell meth and admits it causes me grave 
concern. So you may wanna speak to that." (R. 43/6) 
Defendant's attorney informed the trial court that Defendant didn't have 
any felony convictions as either a juvenile or an adult and that this was his only 
drug related offense. (R. 43/6). The Defendant also addressed the court. The 
Defendant informed the Court that at the end of 2002, he went through a 
divorce and his life went into a downward spiral and he was trying to put his 
life back together. (R. 43/7). His attorney pointed out that the pre-sentence 
report indicated that until that time, "he had a good job, was work - - making 
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good money. This clearly indicates that his wife [sic] went downhill about that 
time." (R.43/7). 
The trial judge responded, 'Tm very familiar with the drug problem. 
I've been involved with the drug court for over three years, and I certainly am 
always interested in helping people to rehabilitate. The other side of that coin 
is, methamphetamine is a huge menace to our society at the present day. It 
screws up people's mental abilities and it's cheap and it is physically tearing 
people's bodies apart. And it's a terrible, terrible drug." (R. 43/7). The 
Defendant was then sentenced to serve an indeterminate term of zero to five 
years at the Utah State prison. (R. 43/7-8). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced the Defendant to 
prison. The Court should have considered the four mitigating factors outlined 
in State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 30 (Utah 1998). These four factors all work in 
Defendant's favor. (1) There was no "victim" who suffered an injury, (2) this 
was the Defendant's first felony as an adult or juvenile and his first drug 
related offense, (3) the Defendant expressed to the trial court his desire to put 
his life back in order, and (4) the court didn't consider his rehabilitative needs 
and the fact that he had been employed and a productive member of society 
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prior to going through a divorce and becoming involved with 
methamphetamine. (Utah 1999). 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT 
SENTENCED THE DEFENDANT TO PRISON. 
The sentencing decision of a trial court is reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion. State v. Houk, 906 P.2d 907, 909 (Utah Ct. App. 1999)(per 
curium). This includes the decision to grant or deny probation. See, State v. 
Chapoose, 985 P.2d 915 (Utah 1999). An abuse of discretion occurs when "the 
judge fails to consider all legally relevant factors or if the sentence imposed is 
clearly excessive." State v. McCovey, 803 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Utah 
1990)(citations and quotations omitted). Furthermore, an appellate court can 
only find an abuse of discretion "it if can be said that no reasonable [person] 
would take the view adopted by the trial court." State v. Houk, 906 P.2d at 909 
(alteration in original)(quotations omitted). 
The trial court abused its discretion in this case because it failed to 
consider all the legally relevant factors and it imposed an excessive sentence. 
Specifically, the trial court failed to consider the Defendant's rehabilitative 
needs. 
The Defendant pled no contest to possession of a controlled substance, a 
third degree felony. The pre-sentence report from Adult Parole and Probation 
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was not included with the official record. However, it is clear from the record 
that the PSI recommended probation. Defendant's attorney asked the Court to 
not impose any further jail time and "other than that, we'd ask the court to 
follow the recommendation." (R. 043/6). 
The trial court indicated that it's inclination was to send him to prison 
because "he's clearly involved in dealing meth, although he's not charged with 
it." (R. 043/6). The trial court did not consider the Defendant's rehabilitative 
needs. The Defendant informed the court that he went through a divorce and 
his life went into a downward spiral and he was trying to put his life together. 
(R. 043/7). Defendant's attorney informed the court that the report (PSI) 
indicated that up until that time he had a good job and that "[t]his clearly 
indicates that his wife [sic] went downhill about that time." Id. 
The Court indicated that it was always interested in helping people to 
rehabilitate. However, the Court didn't acknowledge or address the 
Defendant's rehabilitative needs. It focused on the fact that methamphetamine 
"is a huge menace to our society at the present day. It screws up people's 
mental abilities and it's cheap and it is physically tearing people's bodies apart. 
And it's a terrible, terrible drug." Id. 
These were all reasons why the Defendant should have been placed on 
probation and given a chance at rehabilitation. It's clear from the record that 
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the trial court believed the Defendant was selling methamphetamine. Although 
the Defendant was charged with possession with intent to distribute, he did not 
plead to this offense. A factual basis was placed into the record and the 
prosecutor informed the court that the police were called to a domestic 
disturbance. When the police arrived, the Defendant ran and threw something 
that they discovered was a quarter ounce of methamphetamine." (R. 043/5). 
During the sentencing hearing the trial court referenced baggies. "Meth is a 
bane on our society, and anybody that's running around with lots of baggies to 
sell meth and admits it causes me grave concern." (R. 043/6). The information 
concerning the baggies was contained in the probable cause affidavit. (R. 009). 
This was the Defendant's first felony conviction and his first drug 
related conviction. These factors were apparently not considered by the trial 
court. In State v. GallU 967 P.2d 30 (Utah 1998), the Utah Supreme Court 
outlined four mitigating factors that the trial court failed to consider. The 
Court reversed the trial courts' decisions to impose consecutive sentences. 
Although the Defendant in the case at bar was sentenced on just one charge, 
the Supreme Court's reasoning was sound and should be applied in this case to 
determine if there was an abuse of discretion. In Galli, the Supreme Court 
found that the trial courts' abused their discretion. "[T]he record shows that 
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Judges Iwasaki and Rigtrup may not have given adequate weight to certain 
mitigating circumstances." Id. at 938. 
There were four factors that the trial courts' failed to consider that 
caused them to abuse their discretion. All four factors can be applied favorably 
to the Defendant's situation. The first factor was that Galli had not inflicted 
physical injuries on his victims. Id. Galli had used a gun, but it was a pellet 
gun that was incapable of inflicting a serious injury. Id. In the case at bar, the 
Defendant pled guilty to possessing a quarter ounce of methamphetamine. 
There was no "victim" who he had inflicted an injury on. 
The second factor in Galli was that his criminal history did not support 
the imposition of consecutive sentences. Id. He had a misdemeanor theft 
conviction and minor traffic offenses. The third factor was that Galli had 
voluntarily confessed and admitted responsibility for his crimes. "The record 
suggests that he has expressed a commitment and hope to improve himself." 
Id. In the case at bar, the Defendant informed the court that he was trying to 
put his life back together. (R. 043/7). 
The fourth and final Galli factor was that consecutive sentences were 
not in accord with Galli's rehabilitative needs. The Supreme Court believed 
that Galli's conduct in Minnesota showed that he had the ability to improve 
himself and be a productive law abiding citizen. Id. Likewise, the Defendant 
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had been a productive member of society who had a good job before he went 
through a divorce and became addicted to methamphetamine. 
The trial court should have considered all of the factors outlined by the 
Supreme Court in Galli. The trial court failed to consider these factors, and 
therefore abused its discretion when it sentenced Defendant to the Utah State 
prison. For these reasons, the Defendant respectfully requests this Court to 
remand this case back to the trial court so he can be re-sentenced. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court abused its discretion when it failed to consider 
Defendant's rehabilitative needs. The sentence was clearly excessive for a first 
felony conviction for possession of a controlled substance. For these reasons 
the Defendant respectfully requests this Court to remand his case back to the 
trial court to be re-sentenced. 
DATED this ^  day of May, 2004. / 
1(EE W. SMITH 
Attorney for Appellant 
15 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to 
Mark Shurtleff, Attorney General, Attorney for the Plaintiff, 160 East 300 
South, 6th Floor PO Box 140854 SLC, Utah 84114-0180, postage prepaid 
this \J_ day of May, 2004. 
JIA - i 
t)EE WTSMltH 





SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 031903992 FS 
Judge: ROGER S. DUTSON 




Prosecutor: DAINES, WILLIAM F 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: December 24, 1977 
Video 
Tape Number: D102003 
CHARGES 
1. ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (amended) - 3rd Degree 
Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 09/08/2003 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is 
sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in 
the Utah State Prison. 
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately. 
To the WEBER County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT HAL JR OLSEN, 
Defendant, 
Page 1 031 
Case No: 031903992 
Date: Oct 20, 2003 
Credit is granted for time served. 
Dated this day of ^v<_, 20 . ( 
ROGER ST. DUTSON 
District Court Judge 
Page 2 (last) 032 
ADDENDUM B 
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MR. PARMLEY: THE POLICE WERE CALLED TO A DOMESTIC 
DISTURBANCE. WHEN THEY GOT THERE, THE DEFENDANT WAS LEAVING 
THE SCENE. AND THEY TRIED TO STOP HIM TO TALK TO HIM ABOUT 
WHAT HAPPENED, AND HE RAN AND THREW SOMETHING THAT THEY 
RETRIEVED AND DISCOVERED WAS A QUARTER OUNCE OF 
METHAMPHETAMINE. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. THERE IS A FACTUAL BASE TO ENTER 
THE PLEA AND IT IS ENTERED. YOU HAVE UP UNTIL THE TIME OF 
SENTENCING IN WHICH TO ATTEMPT TO WITHDRAW YOUR PLEA IN 
WRITING. I'LL REFER THIS TO THE ADULT PROBATION DEPARTMENT. 
NOW, MR. OLSEN, YOU MUST GO, IF YOU DO GET RELEASED FROM 
JAIL FOR ANY REASON, IMMEDIATELY TO ADULT PROBATION 
DEPARTMENT. AND KEEP ALL APPOINTMENTS AND COMPLY WITH THEIR 
DEMANDS CONCERNING INFORMATION REGARDING THIS MATTER 
BECAUSE — 
MR. OLSEN: YES, SIR. 
THE COURT: — WE'LL GIVE YOU A SENTENCING DATE. 














OCTOBER 10TH, AND I'LL REDUCE 
THAT'LL BE AT NINE O'CLOCK ON 
10TH AT NINE O'CLOCK. THAT'S 
THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
THANK YOU. 
ALL RIGHT. THAT'S ALL. 





OGDEN, UTAH OCTOBER 20, 2003 
MR. GRAVIS: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. GO TO NUMBER 3, 
ROBERT OLSEN. 
THE CLERK: STATE OF UTAH VERSUS ROBERT HAL OLSEN, 
JUNIOR, CASE 031903992, TIME SET FOR SENTENCING. 
MR. GRAVIS: MR. OLSEN HERE, YOUR HONOR. BELIEVE HE 
TELLS ME HE SPENT — ALREADY SPENT 4 8 DAYS IN JAIL, AND HE 
WAS RELEASED. I'M NOT SURE — HOW DID YOU GET OUT? 
MR. OLSEN: I BAILED. 
MR. GRAVIS: HE POSTED BAIL. AND WE'D ASK THE COURT NOT 
TO IMPOSE ANY FURTHER JAIL TIME. OTHER THAN THAT, WE'D ASK 
THE COURT TO FOLLOW THE RECOMMENDATION. 
THE COURT: MY INCLINATION IS TO SEND HIM TO PRISON, SO 
IF YOU WISH TO SPEAK TO THAT. HE'S CLEARLY INVOLVED IN 
DEALING METH, ALTHOUGH HE'S NOT CHARGED WITH IT. METH IS A 
BANE ON OUR SOCIETY, AND ANYBODY THAT'S RUNNING AROUND WITH 
LOTS OF BAGGIES TO SELL METH AND ADMITS IT CAUSES ME GRAVE 
CONCERN. SO YOU MAY WANNA SPEAK TO THAT. 
MR. GRAVIS: WELL, YOUR HONOR, HE HAS NO OTHER 
FELONIES — CONVICTIONS AS AN ADULT. 
MR. OLSEN: NONE (UNINTELLIGIBLE). 
MR. GRAVIS: NOTHING AS A JUVENILE. APPEARS TO 
BE HIS — HIS ONLY DRUG-RELATED OFFENSE. I'D SUGGEST THAT 
BASED UPON PRIOR RECORD, METH DEALERS WHO GET CONVICTED WITH 
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THAT KIND OF PRIOR RECORD USUALLY DON'T GO TO PRISON. 
MR. OLSEN: YOUR HONOR, IF I MAY — 
THE COURT: LET ME HEAR FROM MR. OLSEN. 
MR. OLSEN: I -- I DON'T KNOW, I WAS IN, WHAT WAS IT, 
2000 — 2000 — END OF 2002 — OR ACTUALLY THE BEGINNING OF 
2002, ME -- I -- ME AND MY WIFE WAS GOING THROUGH — HAVING 
SOME PROBLEMS. AND I GOT AROUND (UNINTELLIGIBLE) DIVORCE. I 
WENT -- I WENT THROUGH ON A DOWN -- DOWNWARD SPIRAL PRETTY 
MUCH, AND I JUST WENT DOWNHILL. AND I'M TRYING TO PUT MY 
LIFE BACK TOGETHER NOW. 
MR. GRAVIS: (UNINTELLIGIBLE) REPORT INDICATES UP TILL 
THAT TIME, HE HAD A GOOD JOB, WAS WORK — MAKING GOOD MONEY. 
THIS CLEARLY INDICATES THAT HIS WIFE WENT DOWNHILL ABOUT THAT 
TIME. 
THE COURT: THANK YOU. STATE WISH TO BE HEARD? 
MR. DAINES: I DON'T, NO, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: OKAY. WELL, YOU KNOW, I'M VERY FAMILIAR 
WITH THE DRUG PROBLEM. I'VE BEEN INVOLVED WITH THE DRUG 
COURT FOR OVER THREE YEARS, AND I CERTAINLY AM ALWAYS 
INTERESTED IN HELPING PEOPLE TO REHABILITATE. THE OTHER SIDE 
OF THAT COIN IS, METHAMPHETAMINE IS A HUGE MENACE TO OUR 
SOCIETY AT THE PRESENT DAY. IT SCREWS UP PEOPLE'S MENTAL 
ABILITIES AND IT'S CHEAP AND IT IS PHYSICALLY TEARING 
PEOPLE'S BODIES APART. AND IT'S A TERRIBLE, TERRIBLE DRUG. 
AND IT'S THE SENTENCE OF THIS COURT THAT YOU SERVE AN 
8 
INDETERMINATE TERM OF ZERO TO FIVE YEARS AT THE UTAH STATE 
PRISON. YOU WILL GET CREDIT FOR THE TIME THAT YOU SERVED. 
THAT'LL BE ALL. 
MR. OLSEN: CAN I HAVE SOME TIME? 
MR. GRAVIS: NO. THEY'LL TAKE YOU INTO CUSTODY. 
***** 
CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH 
) SS 
COUNTY OF WEBER) 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING EIGHT PAGES OF 
TRANSCRIPT CONSTITUTE A TRUE AND ACCURATE RECORD OF THE 
PROCEEDINGS TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND ABILITY AS A 
CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH. 
DATED AT OGDEN, UTAH THIS 13TH DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2003. 
- v/'U, f. fJU' 
DEAN OLSEN, CSR 
